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Abstract— The Aviation industry has been booming for several 
decades and is expected to keep growing in the future. Therefore, 
Air Traffic Management (ATM) tools are likely to be soon 
overwhelmed by the demand. The Single European Sky ATM 
Research Program (SESAR) 2020, controlled by 
EUROCONTROL, intends to revisit the management of 
aeronautical information along its full lifecycle and across the 
whole European ATM system. The efficient sharing of 
information over large scale cyber physical systems is a non-trivial 
problem that raises several challenges including data lineage, data 
consistency, access rights management, and many more. Part of 
the SESAR initiative, System-Wide Information Management 
(SWIM) project defines standards to enhance the security of 
aeronautical data shared among stakeholders. Most of its 
propositions include centralized or partially centralized 
mechanisms in order to enforce data confidentiality, and privacy. 
In this paper, we intend to discuss how blockchains can improve 
the sharing of sensitive data over the ATM system. More 
specifically, we use the example of flight data and describe a high-
level Blockchain-based concept that mimics the decentralized 
nature of existing ATM system to provide a reliable, distributed 
storage platform for flight information. 
Keywords—ATM, blockchains, Flight planning, data security 
I. INTRODUCTION  
The 2019 Deloitte report, on the global Aerospace and 
Defense Industry, suggests the sector will keep growing during 
the next decades. Consequently, Air Traffic Management 
(ATM) systems are likely to experience an increase and 
diversification of communications. 
Anticipating the upcoming obsolescence of the ATM tools, 
EUROCONTROL have launched the Single European Sky 
ATM Research Program (SESAR) 2020.The idea behind this 
project is to offer a complete change in paradigm of how 
aeronautical information is managed along its full lifecycle and 
across the whole European ATM system. Improvements include 
automating and securing the sharing of information between 
European actors, through the SWIM concept, System Wide 
Information Management. 
However, sharing information can suffer from restrictions 
and additional security concerns should be examined. 
Considering a flight plan (formal document containing details 
on a proposed flight), from its submission to the competent 
authorities, until its archiving, many stakeholders have access, 
can update and add data to the document. The integrity and 
authenticity of the shared data are critical for ATM services in 
their attempt to reduce air route congestion. Furthermore, the 
availability and integrity of metadata (e.g. weather and route 
updates, ongoing operations in the airspace), are essential to 
pilots during the flight (e.g. to adapt their trajectory and avoid 
sensitive areas). 
Cyber-security threats on ATM technologies used in the 
sharing of flight data have been recently reported; they include, 
among others: eavesdropping - hearing sensitive and potentially 
critical operational information; jamming - preventing two 
entities (e.g. aircraft and ground station) from talking to each 
other; flooding the aircraft or ground station with messages to 
prevent systems from handling them; message deletion and 
modification. 
Consequently, we split our threat model into two levels. The 
first, "Data Level Threat", defines violations due to entities' 
actions on the data. It includes genuine unreported route 
modifications issued from controllers, resulting in data 
traceability disruption; as well as malicious users' actions, 
resulting in a breach of data integrity. The second level, "Service 
Level Threat", defines the disruption of services' availability, 
either due to unintentional or malicious interferences. 
Many of these issues seem naturally linked to the problems 
solved by blockchains. Indeed, the blockchain technology has 
gained significant popularity in the last decade. In this work, we 
describe how blockchains can be used in ATM to improve the 
security of aeronautical data shared among stakeholders through 
applications compatible with the SWIM standards. Hence, we 
base our study on flight planning, as described above. Currently 
in Europe, the process is centralized, handled by a single central 
entity from EUROCONTROL, the "Network Manager". 
Our goal is to achieve the following security improvements: 
ensure data integrity, traceability, immutability and non-
repudiation by leveraging the main features of blockchains as a 
   
 
   
 
data structure; and ensure availability of data and services during 
all airspace operational phases by using blockchains as a 
distributed storage and decisional system. 
Therefore, we propose a high-level blockchain-based 
concept that mimics the decentralized nature of existing ATM 
systems. On one hand, this solution could cope with some 
environments with no existing centralized architecture and could 
ease the deployment of future ATM services in countries (e.g. 
Africa or South America) without existing ATM architecture. 
On the other hand, this blockchain-based architecture could also 
represent a lighter and more efficient alternative to traditional 
PKI-based architecture which are currently deployed for 
supporting for instance SWIM capabilities. It envisions a 
reliable, distributed storage platform for flight plans, leveraging 
blockchains' main features. 
In addition to the thorough description of our concept, this 
paper provides a review on the intersection of ATM systems and 
blockchains. We present a background on ATM and 
EUROCONTROL's projects, introduce blockchains, discuss 
their applicability to flight planning, and identify open 
challenges in this direction. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT (ATM) 
The European Air Traffic Management (ATM) system is a 
large-scale, safety-critical, cyber-physical system (CPS) 
similarly to the US version. [1] It relies on a ground network 
composed of weather stations and radar facilities which feeds 
enable Air Traffic controllers to handle 25,000 (off-peak 
season) to 35,000 flights daily. [2] 
A. Infrastructure 
In Europe, the administration in charge of the safe and 
seamless ATM is known as the European Organization for the 
Safety of Air Navigation (EUROCONTROL). It handles part of 
the Single European Sky regulations on behalf on the EU. More 
specifically, the "Agency" designates its only executive entity 
and represents the central authority for coordination and 
planning of air traffic control (ATC) for all Europe. 
Anticipating the upcoming obsolescence of the ATM tools 
[3], EUROCONTROL has launched the Single European Sky 
ATM Research Program (SESAR) 2020. The idea behind this 
project is to modify the way aeronautical information is 
managed along its full lifecycle and across the whole European 
ATM system.  The project aims at improving the current ATM 
system on four aspects: by providing a way to handle the rising 
traffic in terms of services' availability (in other words 
improving the system’s "capacity"); by reducing the occurrences 
of accidents and consequently improving "safety"; by preserving 
the "environment" and diminishing the impact of flights on 
global warming; and by cutting the gate-to-gate ATM costs, thus 
improving "cost-effectiveness". The entire European aviation 
business and its stakeholders, from Airport operators and 
ANSPs, to civil and military airspace users and the aerospace 
manufacturing industry, are concerned by the SESAR 
implementation. The primary focus of the regulations is to 
enhance the automation and securing of the sharing of 
information between European actors, through the System Wide 
Information Management (SWIM) concept. 
SWIM is the fundamental keystone for a collaborative 
sharing of information between stakeholders. Its purpose is the 
design of an efficient, unified data exchange platform [4]. It 
consists of a combination of multiple information management 
projects and aims at enhancing the secure sharing of data 
between aeronautical stakeholders. It defines standards for real-
time, reliable and consistent transmission of data among the 
different ATM participants [5]: major airlines, ATC 
departments, airports, etc. Besides implementing mechanisms to 
improve the ATM system's overall efficiency, SWIM 
architecture relies on 5 core services [6]; the 5th, called 
"information assurance", provides security protections 
compatible with the security needs of the ATM users. 
Flight planning is the core mechanism of ATM. It refers to 
the process of producing a flight plan to describe the route an 
aircraft will follow. Its production is mandatory. It contains the 
aircraft identification, the departure and destination aerodromes, 
a description of the route to be followed, a time of departure and 
an estimation of the total elapsed time, among others. It can be 
submitted from up to one year until a few hours before the flight, 
to the entity in charge of the verification and distribution of flight 
plans at EUROCONTROL, called the "Network Manager". 
B. Current concerns & limitations 
Over the past decades, there has been renewed interest in 
moving towards a more adaptable and flexible airspace and 
flight operations to improve traffic flow, capacity, efficiency 
and safety. Despite the effort of researchers and industries, we 
believe that some critical limitations still remain. Below, we 
discuss the four main concerns that would, in our opinion, 
curtail the development of new ATM systems if not considered. 
Scalability. The latest (2019) Deloitte report on the Global 
Aerospace and Defense Industry [7] suggests that the sector will 
likely keep growing over the next decades. More aircraft means 
more passengers using them. Whether it be the Airports Council 
International (ACI) or the International Air Transport 
Association (IATA), the expected number of passengers in the 
2040's will likely be twice times the current levels. Similar 
growth has been witnessed during the past 20 years, yet human 
traffic controllers and airspace resources, such as the ground 
infrastructure have not been upgraded [8]. The scalability of the 
aeronautical physical infrastructure and resources is a prominent 
preoccupation. 
Resilience. The ATM system will become more vulnerable 
to malicious attacks that aim to compromise stakeholders and 
flight data. [9] The two major reasons are: first, because Air 
Traffic Navigations Service Providers (ANSPs) rely on a 
growing number of interconnected services, situation that will 
get worse with the development and use of SESAR [10]. Indeed, 
the project enhances the sharing of information and promotes 
the interconnection between aeronautical stakeholders. Because 
of that, SESAR will likely increase the attack surface of any 
future malware. Secondly, while the previous ATM systems 
were relying on specialized and expert knowledge, providing 
security through isolation and obscurity, a current trend is to use 
Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) software [11]. Examples 
include the integration of the Linux OS, the implementation of 
Identify applicable funding agency here. If none, delete this text box. 
   
 
   
 
the Internet Protocol (IP) and Voice over IP (VOIP), as well as 
enhancements to GPS. 
Consistency. Therefore, the diversity and heterogeneity of 
the ATM ecosystem is likely to generate inconsistency in the 
data shared among stakeholders. Indeed, the geographical 
distribution of the nodes is the first concern as latency and 
propagation time are not the same depending on the 
environmental context (the weather impacts connectivity). 
Furthermore, the nature of the systems can also be a serious 
impediment to their processing capabilities (regarding the 
computational power of their components for instance). Keeping 
a consistent view of the system and the data transferred through 
the network is therefore of utmost importance. 
Privacy. Sharing information implies the implementation of 
mechanisms able to restrict the access to the data to the 
authorized entities only. Indeed, new systems developed and 
promoted in the context of SESAR, notably the Automatic 
Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) system, do not 
incorporate functions to insure a granular-level of privacy, when 
required (for instance in the case of military flights). [12] ADS-
B systems are particularly useful in the positioning of aircraft in 
geographical zones where the deployment ground-based radars 
and systems is difficult. However, the technology relies on the 
broadcast of an aircraft’s positions to all its peers within a 
limited range. Therefore, an adversary close enough to the 
emitting aircraft can eavesdrop its exact location and eventually 
predict its future route. The privacy leakage could therefore have 
a disastrous impact on users’ safety (e.g. terrorist attack). 
Currently, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is the cryptographic 
solution privileged by the Aviation Community to address these 
privacy concerns. Their idea is to encrypt flight data so to restrict 
their access to the authorized parties. However, PKI is a heavy 
process to implement and maintain. Therefore, the 
confidentiality issue remains an ongoing challenge.  
In recent years, since the advent of Bitcoin in 2009 to be 
exact, its underlying technology has become very popular by 
itself: also known as the blockchain. In this article, we consider 
the ATM environment, its flaws and limitations, and try to 
envision how the blockchain can potentially be used to tackle or 
at least reduce their impact on the overall system safety (which 
includes the passengers and stakeholders' safety). 
III. BACKGROUND ON BLOCKCHAINS 
A Blockchain is essentially a digitized, distributed and 
public database, also called "ledger", that records all the 
transactions or digital events that have been executed and shared 
among a network. When a peer joins the network, they get a 
local copy of the current state of its associated ledger. There 
exist several types of blockchains: according to the degree of 
anonymity provided to the users or to the amount of trust put 
into the validators; but also depending on the algorithm chosen 
to achieve a consensus. 
A. Fundamental keystones 
Blockchains are built upon basic components which, put 
together, constitute the technology’s strength. These include the 
use of hash functions and blocks to organize data, and its 
chained and distributed nature to replicate them. These 
elements are described in the following paragraphs.  
Hash functions. The first and essential mechanism upon 
which is built any blockchain is the cryptographic hash function 
chosen for its design. A cryptographic hash function is a 
function that maps an input of arbitrary length to an output of a 
fixed length of bits, also called the hash (value). A robust hash 
function H must satisfy three security requirements that prevent 
an adversary that knows the input, the output or both to forge 
another distinct input that would match the same output. In the 
context of blockchains, the hash of a block refers to its 
fingerprint. It is a unique and alphanumeric identifier. Therefore, 
one must take special attention to how strongly respected the 
requirements are. Indeed, having a weak hash function would 
result in finding another transaction or block with the same 
identifier and thus enable an attacker to change the content of 
one block while keeping the chain intact, in other words: without 
the other peers noticing it. 
 
Figure 1 - Simplistic view of a Blockchain's data structure [13] 
Block. The second brick in the blockchain technology is the 
block. A block incorporates a lot of information related to the 
network, the application and the current state of the ledger; 
among others, it stores: a number – incremental, starts at 0 for 
the genesis block; a nonce – an alphanumeric string used to 
compute the hash value of the block; some data; its hash and the 
hash of the previous block in the chain. 
Chain. Consequently, a blockchain is a chain of approved 
blocks, linked together by incorporating the hash value of the 
latest added block into the new one. The consensus used to add 
a block differs depending of the application considered. In the 
case of Bitcoin, only "signed" blocks can be added to the 
blockchain.  Signing a block refers to the process of computing 
the hash value of the block by bruteforcing on the nonce value, 
i.e. trying several nonce values until finding a value below a 
certain threshold called the "difficulty". This mechanism is also 
known as "proof-of-work". 
Distribution. In addition to this data structure, blockchains 
leverage the power of distribution by relying on a peer-to-peer 
network. Each peer stores a local version of the ledger, updated 
each time the consensus is reached. Its chained data structure 
along with its distribution among the peers is what make 
blockchain a secured database. Indeed, tampering with a block 
   
 
   
 
changes its hash value and comparing this chain to the existing 
copies of the ledger reveals the ongoing modifications.  
B. Taxonomy of Blockchains 
There are several studies describing complex and detailed 
taxonomies of blockchain technologies. The taxonomy of 
Ballandies et al. [14] details the most comprehensive study, that 
includes a crowd-sourced evaluation feedback from experts in 
the blockchain community. They identify cryptocurrency-
based blockchains as a set of four components: the distributed 
ledger (DL), the consensus, the action and the token 
component. Each component is derived into attributes; in total, 
they study 19 different attributes (e.g. the read and actor 
permission attributes related to the action component, the write 
and validate permission attributes linked to the consensus 
component).  
Unlike common sayings, the Bitcoin blockchain is not 
anonymous but pseudonymous. Some studies have shown that 
it was possible to link together the transactions issued by one 
pseudonym (transaction graph analysis paper); others have 
proven the possibility of associating the found clusters to the 
pseudonyms' real-world identities (network-based analysis). 
However, for some applications, especially in healthcare and 
financial systems, complete anonymity in transactions over the 
network is essential. Therefore, an alternative to public 
blockchains is needed. From Ballandies et al.'s work, we can 
identify four different clusters of blockchain technologies, that 
provide four distinct levels of confidentiality. 
Public and Permissionless blockchains. Every node, with 
a network connection and a terminal device, can write on the 
ledger and become a validator (run the consensus algorithm). 
Inside the network, authorized actions and permissions are the 
same for every participant (e.g. Bitcoin [25]). 
Public and Permissioned blockchains. There is no 
restricted access to the network itself, but only certain nodes are 
granted the validation function; others are only passive owners 
of the data (e.g. IOTA [26]). 
Private and Permissionless blockchains. The access to the 
network is restricted, but once the participant is authenticated, 
the read and write permissions are the same the other nodes on 
the network. It can be compared to a company-wide intranet: 
the access is granted by a third-party; but every "authenticated" 
node can perform any actions (e.g. Ripple [27]). 
Private and Permissioned blockchains. Only certain 
participants are granted access and only some of the nodes have 
permission to add information. It is the most restrictive type of 
blockchains: the access is granted by a third-party which also 
manage the permissions (e.g. Ripple). 
Therefore, depending on the degree of trust one puts in their 
peers and the degree of anonymity they want to provide, they 
will choose between one of the four families. 
C. Consensus algorithms 
The implementation choice between the different types of 
blockchains is directly related to the application context. 
Depending on this choice, one family of consensus algorithm 
would be privileged. For instance, the use of Proof of Work 
(Pow) based algorithms is interesting for public blockchains 
because of their large scale; the use of computational power as 
the elective resource complicates the compromising of more 
than 51% of the network's power [28]. However, private 
networks, because of their limited resources, are more 
vulnerable. 
In blockchain networks, the consensus is the process by 
which new data are declared worthy of being added to the 
previous records; it refers to the block validation mechanism. 
The "validation", also called "verification", consists in signing a 
block, i.e. finding a nonce n, random parameter, such as the hash 
h of the block's content c along with the nonce n answers certain 
conditions Cs. In Bitcoin, a block is signed when the resulting 
hash h is less than the target hash h0. For nonce n, alphanumeric 
string, find hash h such as: h = f(c|n) ≤ h0, with f hash function. 
The value of the target hash h0 defines the difficulty of 
running the consensus. Upon success, the peer will send the hash 
h, the nonce n and the content c of the block B to its peers. 
Verifying the validity of the signing is then simple, as all data 
are known, and consists in computing f(c|n), with f the same 
hash function, and comparing the result h' obtained to the 
expected result h.  
This agreement on a unique and common view of the 
blockchain should be achieved, even in the presence of faulty 
nodes, also called "Byzantine" nodes. These faulty nodes 
usually have arbitrary behavior including malicious attacks (e.g. 
Sybil attacks [15], and double spending [16]) nodes mistakes or 
also connection errors (e.g. leading to forks [17]). 
The consensus protocols vary as mentioned above and can 
be categorized into two big families: they are either 
collaboratively or competitively computed. 
Examples of competitive consensus algorithms are: 
• Proof of work (PoW). This is the most popular scheme, 
used in Bitcoin. A node earns the right to add a new 
block to the chain if it can demonstrate having spent a 
certain amount of computational power. To do so, it has 
to solve a computationally difficult cryptographic 
puzzle as presented above (hash computation).  
• Proof of Stake (PoS). Implementation partially in 
Ethereum, and entirely in BlackCoin [20] and Peercoin 
[21], the proof of stake assumes that entities having a 
large stake in the blockchain have more interest in 
guaranteeing its integrity. IN this case, the probability a 
node has to mine the next block is linked to the 
proportion of its stakes. 
The collaborative consensus algorithms stand out since 
there is no puzzle to solve before the others. Instead, nodes are 
granted the authority to validate blocks because they have been 
approved by a trusted third party in the case of the Proof of 
Authority (PoA) [22-23], or because of their honest history in 
the network like with the Proof of Reputation (PoR) [24]. These 
alternative algorithms have been developed to address the main 
and major flaw of the PoW-based consensus algorithms, that is 
the high energy required to compute the puzzle. 
   
 
   
 
IV. RELATED WORK 
Few articles have been presenting blockchain-based 
solutions for improving the security of the next generation 
aeronautical and ATM systems. 
In [18], the authors propose a new blockchain-based 
algorithmic approach to achieve secure communications 
between aircraft and ground stations (GSs). The scheme relies 
on three algorithms, each one defining the interactions between 
aircraft and ground stations for a specific context. The first 
algorithm defines the registration procedure and the storage of 
registration details in the distributed ledger. The second 
describes the first authentication negotiation between both 
entities. And finally, the third one determines how entities 
communicate after this first exchange, i.e. once authenticated. 
While the solution ensures private communication for registered 
parties (if the registration details, including the public and 
private keys, are not stored in the ledger, there is no chance to 
encrypt the data transferred between parties), there are some 
limitations. The first one concerns the storing of the private keys 
inside the ground stations which could cause severe privacy 
leakages in case of compromising. Then, the ledger that records 
the identification data is indeed distributed (among the ground 
station nodes) but there is no mention to any consensus 
algorithm used to add the data to the chain, nor to a choice of a 
technology (e.g. « bitcoin-like blockchains », « consortium 
blockchain », etc).  
In [12], the author stresses once again the security and 
privacy issues related to the adoption of ADS-B systems, and 
the defiance from the military aviation community. His paper is 
a contribution to the cryptographically « secure broadcast 
authorization » by presenting a novel blockchain-based PKI 
implementation. To do so, he presents a « Aviation Blockchain 
Infrastructure » that leverages the Hyperledger Fabric (HLF) 
software, as it is argued to be the more suitable to meet 
enterprise-like requirements. Indeed, the prototype described 
defines different types of « organizations » according to the 
nodes that compose the aeronautical network (e.g. military, 
corporate and civilian aircraft are simulated as well as airline 
companies and Air Traffic Management Services, ATMS). For 
each organization, a ledger is generated with associated access 
rights (e.g. military-type ledgers are only accessible by the 
aircraft at stake and ATMS; airline companies create one ledger 
for each of their aircraft in-flight). While this paper presents an 
exhaustive description of the roles and ledgers composing the 
prototype and propose to use a well-known private blockchain 
like HLF, it lacks of performance evaluations as well as security 
analysis. 
SWIM Registry is a key element of next generation 
aeronautical systems that enhances interoperability by 
referencing the sources of the services available for SWIM 
applications. It consists in three entities: service providers, 
behind the design of services; service consumers, that 
implement the applications; and the regulatory authority, for the 
communication and monitoring of services and applications via 
registry.  The idea in [19] is to associate each service with its 
own blockchain. Access to the blocks is restricted in writing and 
reading permissions to authorized parties only. A case of 
application is flight planning data. Each stored transaction is a 
flight plan, of which the access requires the knowledge of the 
hash generated during the registration process. The authors use, 
once again, the chained structure of the blockchain as well as its 
distributed nature as the two main features for their contribution. 
However, there is no clear explanation on how the data are 
validated, and how the access to the data is monitored by a 
trusted third party (i.e. the service system).  
V. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Problem statement 
There are two major drawbacks related to the current flight 
planning process and the new technologies developed to 
improve it.  
1) Inconsistency in flight planning. The larger the network 
becomes, the more difficult it is to maintain a consistent view of 
a specific flight plan among it. Therefore, we need to implement 
a mechanism that enables fast and secure updates and their 
recording within a peer-to-peer network.  
2) Privacy leakage due to new systems. As exposed in the 
related work section, new developed components (e.g. ADS-B) 
do not necessarily incorporate privacy-preserving and security 
functions. Indeed, flight data are currently not considered as 
confidential data. However, they are highly sensitive and, in 
some case, critical to the safety of operations and operators. 
Therefore, they are becoming more valuable to malicious 
adversaries, easier to target and lead to dramatic safety breaches. 
Consequently, as part of the safety-for-security process, we need 
to define and apply an additional security layer to protect the 
aeronautical data and secure their sharing through existing 
communication protocols.  
B. Nodes 
The ATM system is composed of different types of 
stakeholders, all sharing information to enhance the safety and 
security of the past, future and ongoing flights. The list of 
aeronautical stakeholders is provided in Table 1 along with 
their respective group id and the information they share. 
 
Table 1 - Nodes' description 
Set Name Composition Information 
U Users Pilots/Aircraft Flight plan; location 
E External 
sources 
Sensors, 
Meteorological 
Services; Airline/ 
Airport/ Military 
operations centers 
SO6 traffic flow; weather 
forecasts; flight cancellation, 
merging; ground operations 
(runway upgrades, incidents); … 
A Approvers ANSPs Flight plan approval; route 
changes; traffic information 
 
C. Flight Data 
Flight data are of two types: there are flight plans, initially filled 
by the end-user and modify as required all along the flight by 
ANSPs. And there are the SO6 files which are aeronautical 
information automatically generated by the radars.  
   
 
   
 
1) Flight plans 
 
2) SO6 files 
 
D. Storyline 
We consider a scenario where an operator (pilot of an aircraft 
or airline company on behalf of the pilot) uses the Air Traffic 
Control and Management services provided by 
EUROCONTROL’s ANSP (Air Navigation Service Provider) 
network to fly from an airport (departure) to another (arrival).  
We assume that the ANSPs are responsible for the collection of 
events (including military operations, ground operations, 
weather forecast, etc.), their processing and integration into the 
flight plan for to be addressed in almost real-time to the 
operator (in the form of recommendations: changing route, 
alternative arrival airport, on hold, etc). 
E. Desired properties 
In the traditional ATM system, military flights can be 
granted with a certain level of anonymity to prevent the release 
of critical, sensitive operational data. With the recent projects 
in Aviation (SESAR20 in Europe and NextGen in the US), 
automation in the data collection (ADS-B systems for 
positioning), as well as the increased collaborative decision-
making leads to the leakage of information to parties that may 
not be authorized to access them. While considering/hearing the 
requests from the community, in terms of data and users’ 
privacy, EUROCONTROL still advocates for the non-
provision of ATC and ATM services to anonymous aircraft. 
Therefore, there is an urgent need to find a mechanism for a 
tradeoff between user privacy and data traceability.  
Traceability. EUROCONTROL’s Network Manager is the 
entity responsible for the reception, analysis and distribution of 
flight data. It is also the authority that charges aeronautical 
stakeholders that benefit from the use of ATC and ATM 
services. Due to the heterogeneity in the Aviation network and 
their wide spread spatial expansion, flight planning suffers from 
data inconsistency. The lack of traceability n impacts the 
relationship between airline companies and EUROCONTROL, 
with recurring disagreements on the charges imposed for using 
their services, due to the lack of traceability.  
Privacy. Some airspace users expect their activities to be 
kept private (military operations, medical emergencies, 
diplomatic travels, etc). We argue that current airspace 
communications (e.g. when an aircraft broadcasts its position 
to its closest peers; or when it receives commands from the 
ATM controller) can’t be changed to enable private 
communication (i.e. we won’t implement mechanisms to 
ensure directional/isolated communications). Communications 
can be eavesdropped. Therefore, privacy should be taken into 
consideration along with the data itself (e.g. encryption).  
Performance. The ATM system is operating in a real-time 
fashion and nodes have limited capabilities in terms of storage 
space, computational power, etc. (especially aircraft and 
sensors). This introduces the following constraints: 
- Real-time processing: the mechanisms implemented to 
enhance privacy and ensure traceability should not introduce 
additional delays in communications above a certain conceded 
threshold (to be defined in line with the application). 
- Minimal processing: the mechanisms should be defined in 
compliance with the smallest (in terms of resources) nodes 
(probably the sensors). For instance, if encryption is retained 
for privacy-preserving mechanisms, it should be lightweight 
enough to be handled by a sensor node. 
F. Limitations and scope 
Infrastructure. The ATC and ATM physical infrastructure 
cannot be changed. We are working with standards defined as 
in the SESAR 2020 project, with physical facilities that 
represent the ground foundation of the ATM network. 
Therefore, our initiative here does not aim at proposing a new 
architecture for the whole physical system, but rather a protocol 
of communication that would allow for the recording of 
aeronautical data in an inconspicuous fashion while 
guaranteeing the safety and security of the system and its 
participants. 
Authentication process. An adversary may compromise a 
node. However, we argue that, while it can lead to catastrophic 
incidents, it can also be done in the traditional systems. Our 
concerns are about ensuring the traceability of the data (data 
lineage) along its lifecycle and providing required levels of 
confidentiality. The solution itself does not provide means to 
authenticated users prior to their entrance in the network, but 
rather mechanisms to detect abnormal behaviors of 
authenticated participants. The first authenticity checks are 
offload to a trusted third party (e.g. EUROCONTROL, 
governments, etc.). 
Real-time. The ATM system is a cyber physical system 
(CPS). It implies relationships between digital systems and the 
real-world activities (quote). Moreover, it is a Critical 
Infrastructure (CI), i.e. a system where safety and security are 
in tandem. As the real, physical world is timed, any digital 
operation leading to a decision making with direct impacts on 
physical systems should be processed in real-time. Real-time is 
not achievable, therefore, we aim at designing this solution such 
as it releases commands in quasi-real-time. 
VI. OUR APPROACH 
In the following section, we introduce a layered overview of the 
ATM application and incorporate a description of the 
blockchain model we envisioned. We decided to narrow down 
the protection of aeronautical data to the management 
(submission, validation and recording) of flight plans. We detail 
a mathematical characterization of the acting nodes and present 
a basic Flight Planning management workflow relying on 
blockchain-based interactions.  
   
 
   
 
A. Node characterization 
Let time t be a real number such as t in	[0, T]. Let (x(t), y(t), 
z(t)) in [-180;180]x[-180;180]x[-370;+∞[ (-370 m under sea 
level is the airport of Bar Yehuda, Israel) be the 3D coordinates 
of the aeronautical object for each time t. x(t) and y(t) are 
respectively the latitude and longitude of the object in degree, 
and z(t) its altitude in meters. Because of the aeronautical 
context, we may change this metric in the future, to the profit 
of Flight Levels (FLs). 
A node n(t) indiscriminately refers to a user, an approver or 
an external node (see Table 1). Each node is identified by the 
following tuple: (ID, x(t), y(t), z(t)), where ID is a unique 
constant alphanumerical identifier for the node, and (x(t), y(t), 
z(t)) its 3D coordinates in space as defined above. As a tradeoff 
between the continuous nature of the airspace activities and the 
discrete representation of data, we introduce a simplified, 
discrete representation for the nodes as follows:  ni = (ID, xi, yi, 
zi); the set {ni}i=0..N where N is bounded (and refers to the 
number of locations crossed to reach the arrival from the 
departure airport) represents the effectively followed route. 
User node. Let U denote the set of users, that is, nu in U 
indiscriminately designates the pilot and their aircraft. Note: 
these are the only moving nodes. The user node positions 
({niu})i=0..N are identified via the tuples {(ID, xiu, yiu, ziu)}i=0..N.  
User nodes can be categorized into two categories: ordinary 
user nodes and special user nodes. The special nodes require a 
specific treatment due to the critical and sensitive activities they 
perform (e.g. military operations). A special node will be 
declared with an additional label that would specify the level of 
confidentiality it needs. 
Approver node. Let A be the set of approvers. Approver 
nodes are identified by the tuples (ID, xa, ya, za), which do not 
depend on the variable t, because these nodes are fixed. They 
refer to the ANSPs, Air Navigation Service Providers. 
Validator nodes have been approved by the CA and granted the 
authority to validate the flight plans, propose modifications, etc. 
External node. Let E be the set of external sources to the 
ATM network. These are typically the nodes that provide useful 
information for the ATC and ATM services in a one-way 
fashion. They cannot read the information stored in the 
blockchain, but still can submit transaction (information feeds) 
to be added to the blockchain for traceability purposes and 
incorporated in the ATM decision making process. E regroups 
the sensors (automated radar network) as well as the 
meteorological services, airport, airline and military operations 
centers. We assume that the two latter may need an additional 
level of privacy. For now, we just make the following 
simplified assumption: the confidentiality required applies on 
the nature of the operation not the location nor the time when it 
is performed. External nodes are identified via tuples similar to 
(ID, xs, ys, zs), which do not depend on the variable t, because 
these nodes are static.  
B. A layered overview 
On Figure 2, we give a layered overview of our envisioned 
Blockchain-based Flight Planning Architecture for Reliable 
Data Traceability and Confidentiality. 
The top layer corresponds to the physical world and 
represents the three phases of a flight: the pre-flight phase, 
when the pilot formulates the flight plan and interacts with the 
ANSPs to modify it if necessary; the in-flight phase, during 
which the aircraft is in the air and receives eventually updates 
from the ANSPs; and finally, the post-flight phase which 
corresponds to the archiving of the flight plan.   
The second layer, called “Infrastructure layer”, 
geographically positions the blockchain’s nodes on the map.  
The network layer represents the digital peer-to-peer 
network and is composed by user nodes (black), external 
sources (blue) and approver node (orange). The approver nodes 
receive, broadcast the flight plan to their peer and run the 
verification protocol.  
Finally, the bottom layer corresponds to the blockchain data 
structure. Each modification (pre-flight phase and in-flight) 
triggers the recording of the modified flight plan (for 
traceability purpose).  
 
Figure 2 - A Blockchain -based Flight Planning Architecture for 
Reliable Data Traceability and Confidentiality 
C. Proposed workflow 
Nominal behavior. Here below, and as illustrated on Figure 
3, we describe the normal interactions that should be observed 
within the network if all parties are honest.  
Before the flight: 
1) Initialize: A user U0 submits the initial flight plan FP to 
one of the approvers A0. 
   
 
   
 
2) Collect: In the meantime, A0 collects information I from 
the external sources (Upload). 
3) Synthetize: Based on the flight plan FP and the 
information I, A0 approves/modifies the flight plan and sends it 
back to user U0. 
4) Process: User U0 analyses the suggestions of A0 and 
either agrees (step 5) or proposes alternative modifications (go 
back to 3). 
5) Accept: 3 and 4 are repeated until U0 and A0 agree on a 
common version of the flight plan FP0, the approved plan. At 
that point, the approver A0 will 6) Store the flight plan and make 
it available (only) for U0 to see it at any time. 
During the flight: 
7) Update: During the flight, A0 receives updated 
information from its sources E. These data are likely to 
influence the route of the flight for safety reasons (weather, 
ground/air operations, etc.) 
After the flight:  
8) Record: At the end of the flight, A0 makes sure to report 
any change I nthe route of the flight compared to the initial 
flight plan approverd by both parties FP0  and to correlate these 
modifications to the information provided by the set E. 
 
Figure 3 - Nominal behavior, workflow execution chart 
D. Peers’ possible actions 
In this environment, the nodes are allowed to perform some 
actions to fuel the data flow according to the needs of the ATM 
application and related to the use of blockchains. These actions 
are described below. 
Submission. In the best-case scenario, an owner O1 inserts 
their filled flight plan in a transaction and sends it to the 
blockchain network. This document includes the departure and 
arrival aerodrome, a list L of en-route points. An en-route point 
belongs to a Flight Information Region (FIR) itself 
administrated by an Area Control Center (ACC). It determines 
the altitude and time at which the aircraft will cross a specific 
location. The election of the validators is based on this list L. 
Let’s note that the FIRs’ surface is different in the upper 
airspace and the lower airspace. Therefore, the set of validators 
is chosen as the union of both sets of ACCs of the crossed FIRs 
from the upper airspace and the lower airspace; they are 
denoted ACC Type1 on the map. ACCs of Type2 are the 
validators that are not concerned by the flight. 
Verification. The validators concerned by the flight will 
individually run the verification process. They will check: the 
identity of the owner O1, the authenticity of the data transferred, 
the validity of the flight plan, its conformity with air traffic 
regulations. And finally, they check their own availability for 
the time of crossing. If approved, the validator sends back a 
signed approval message. 
Modification. Sometimes, adjustments are required. For 
instance, one controller can handle only 20 aircrafts at the same 
time. Therefore, it can happen that the available capacity in one 
area of control may slightly change between the preparation of 
the flight plan and its submission. In that case, the validator will 
send a "modification request". This request will include the 
reason invoked, a list of the closest en-route point alternatives 
with their current capacity for the time of crossing. The 
modification request is sent to owner O1 but also to the ACCs 
in charge of the proposed en-route point alternatives. O1 will 
then either chose one alternative and re-start the negotiation 
process or cancel the flight. 
In-flight updates. Due to meteorological events or 
fortuitous in-air or ground operations, the controller may need 
to change the route of an aircraft. (e.g. a weather forecast 
reporting a big storm). The controller decides to send an 
"update request" to inform the aircraft affected by the storm and 
propose an alternative route. The forecast has been received by 
everyone, including all the set of validators from the previous 
update. A new set of validators is immediately elected: it 
comprises the latest update’s set of validators plus the newest 
validators affected by the proposed alternative route. All check 
the proposition and upon agreement, the pilot is authorized to 
change its course. 
Archiving. The archiving process is simplified by the 
chained nature of the blockchain. Indeed, the final flight plan, 
that will be used by Eurocontrol to compute the amount of fees 
to tax, can be obtained by tracking all the transactions related 
to the flight. 
E. Performance Evaluation 
While lot of studies have tried to evaluate the performance of 
blockchain technologies, comparing them to one another, and 
despite of the recent design of benchmarking frameworks [20], 
the performance evaluation remains one of the main challenges 
when designing a blockchain-based system. Moreover, to the 
best of our knowledge, no evaluation study has been done yet 
regarding the use of blockchains applied to Aeronautical 
context. As part of our future work, we aim to provide such 
analysis. To do so, we are planning to: 
1) Expand our mathematical representation of the ATM 
application by incoporating a technical description of the data, 
peers and communication links between them; 
2) Based on this description, we will qualitatively compare 
several blockchain options, evaluate them according to the 
   
 
   
 
observed throughput and latency introduced by their consensus 
algorithm, the memory footprint generated by the production 
and storage of flight plan, as well as the energy consumption in 
terms of computational power.  
3) We will consequently choose the best option and 
implement it. Through simulations, we will evaluate the system 
designed in terms of performance and security. 
F. Main challenges,  
Consequently, as of now, we identify the main challenges 
to overcome before being able to formulate a strong and 
relevant performance analysis and benefit from the use of 
blockchains in this context. We will have to clarify two major 
concepts: the first one is the data representation; and the second, 
the decision-making process. 
Data representation. Blockchains are first and foremost 
distributed databases. It implies that the data and the recording 
techniques should comply not only with the application context 
(i.e. that the recorded data are of interest and relevant in regards 
with the application considered) but also with the peers that 
compose the network (which have limited resources in terms of 
storage space and computational power). Consequently, one 
will have to take special precautions regarding the data 
selection and their representation. In MPF-BC for instance, 
authors develop functions that reduce the memory footprint of 
their blockchain. 
Decision making. The addition of new transactions to the 
blockchain’s ledger is the result of an agreement between node. 
This agreement can be reached either cooperatively or 
competitively. In the case of Bitcoin and any PoW-based 
blockchain, the election of the node that will be able to add new 
data to the chain is performed via the computation of a highly 
difficult mathematical puzzle. The first node to find a solution 
is the one elected. On the other hand, in PoA-based blockchain, 
the agreement is reached via cooperation between "authorized" 
nodes. Choosing the consensus algorithm compatible with the 
application and environment is critical for the viability of the 
blockchain solution. It depends on the type of blockchain 
considered. Indeed, public blockchains rely on a fully 
untrustworthy P2P network, as anyone can join and quit the 
network, i.e. there is little or no monitoring of identities 
(pseudonymous network). Therefore, collaboration is excluded; 
in that case, competitive consensus algorithms will be preferred 
(PoW, PoS). On the other hand, for private blockchains, the 
access to the network is monitored by competent and trusted 
authorities. In this case, nodes are no longer anonymous, we 
know their identity - or at least, if identities are kept private, 
there is proof of authenticity provided by the agreement given 
by the certifying authority (which is the only to know the node’s 
true identity). 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
In this paper, we introduced a high-level blockchain based 
concept for improving flight planning efficiency and security. 
We believe that decentralization is the key for better 
performance and improved security as no central authority can 
hijack the whole system nor be targeted as the high-value asset 
it represents. Also, by distributing the data storage and 
computations, we remove all risks related to the single point of 
failure, such as the unavailability of services and data, the 
alteration of flight plans, the compromising/leakage of recorded 
information. However, we still have some challenges to 
overcome before being able to propose a fully functioning 
prototype. These are summarized as follows: 
Refine. In our future work, we want to refine this high-level 
presentation of the system, in terms of technical functions. We 
will develop our mathematical model of the system, provide a 
threat model as well and detail the parameters and functions that 
we need in order to enable the introduced actions.  
Choose. With a more technical view of the nodes, the data 
exchanged, and the protocols used to manipulate and share the 
data, we will be able to choose which type of blockchains is the 
most suitable to our application’s context. 
Analyze. We plan on deepen the mathematical model by 
providing an adversarial model, and perform a qualitative threat 
analysis on this system.  
Implement. The final goal of this project is to implement 
the solution and test it on real-world data, that would be 
provided by EUROCONTROL. In addition, we would perform 
on evaluation of the model in terms of performance and 
security.  
Once these challenges are addressed, our goal will be to 
evaluate the proposed solution and to compare it to traditional 
PKI-based architecture, currently deployed in the ATM 
environment, which are efficient but very expensive solutions. 
The comparison would determine the limitations and plus-value 
of one solution in regards with the other both in terms of 
performance and security. 
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